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I. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The trial court had jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-34(1). This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3.
The Memorandum Decision was entered by the trial court on April 28, 2006, The Order Denying
Defendant's Motion for New Trial or Amend Judgment was entered on February 10, 2006, Mel
Ingersol's Notice of Appeal was filed on March 16, 2006, pursuant to Rule 4(a), Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
II. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
APPELLANT ISSUE NO. 1: Did the trial court err when it concluded that there was no contract
between the Appellant and the Appellee when both parties testified that there had been a
contract? The standard of review for findings of fact is the clearly erroneous standard. For a
reviewing court to find error, it must decide that the factual findings made by the trial court are
not adequately supported by the record. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994).
APPELLANT ISSUE NO. 2: Did the trial court err in finding that there was no contract when
that issue was not in contention and was not disputed by the parties? Since the issue was not in
contention, the parties did not prepare to present evidence on the issue. The standard of review
for findings of fact is the clearly erroneous standard. For a reviewing court to find error, it must
decide that the factual findings made by the trial court are not adequately supported by the
record. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994).
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III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On May 15, 2002 the parties met and came to an agreement that was partially put in
writing. It stated:

Whereas A-l acknowledges a credit owing Mel Ingersoll in the amount of $14,500,
to be paid in the following manner: A-l will furnish 30 yard (drop off) containers for
Ingersoll for a cost of $75.00 each with A-l paying landfill cost over that. Thereby
if trucking & landfill total $ 10,000 for a month, Ingersoll will pay $2,500 and use the
$7,500 credit on the amount due. Billing will be at month end, with the payment
25% of total bill to be paid by 10th of each month following. Service can continue
after credit is used up if its agreeable with both parties.
Appellee began its service almost immediately. The service was provided from mid-May, 2002
through August, 2002. Invoices were sent by Appellee to Appellant weekly. The services
stopped in August, 2002. The parties then met in October, 2002. At that meeting the parties
discussed the amount of the services received and the amount of the credit owed. They wrote out
numbers on a piece of paper representing such services rendered and credit owed. That paper
showed that appellant was owed at that time the sum of $6,193.00 remaining on the credit.
At trial, the above facts were testified to by both parties. Although there was some
disagreement with respect to the amount of the services rendered and the credit owed, both
parties agreed that a valid agreement had been reached on May 15, 2002. However, despite both
parties' testimony that a contract had been formed, the trial court ruled that a contract had not
been formed; and based its ruling on that finding.
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IV. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court made an erroneous finding that a contract did not exist between the
parties. The finding was erroneous because both parties had pled that a contract had been formed
between the parties, and during trial, both introduced evidence that a contract had been formed
between the parties. The trial court cannot disregard the record to make a finding, therefore the
trial court's finding that a contract did not exist should be reversed.

V. ARGUMENT
a. Introduction
The trial court erred in its finding that there was no meeting of the minds of the parties
that created a multi- party contract because that finding is contrary both to the evidence presented
at the trial and the judicial admissions of the parties. Such error requires that this the trial court's
decision that a contract did not exist be reversed.
b.

The Appellee Made Judicial Admissions of the Existence of a Contract in its
Pleadings Filed with the Trial Court
The Appellee admitted to the existence of a contract in its pleadings filed with the trial

court. The original cause of action brought by the Appellee shows the existence of a contract.
The Appellee brought this cause of action on February 19, 2003, claiming that Appellant owed it
$9,006.25. (Complaint at 1). The basis for its claim that it was owed $9,006.25 by Appellant was
that it had entered into a contract for goods and services. (Appellee's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law ^[5). At paragraph 6 of its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
3

Appellee stated:
That part of the agreement was that Defendant would provide a certain motor
vehicle valued at $14,500.00 to one Mark Powell, Mark Powell would deliver
a motor vehicle and three roll-off containers valued at $14,500.00 to Plaintiff
and Defendant would be entitled to credit for the value of the vehicle he
provided to Powell in the amount of $14,500, from Plaintiff. The agreement
also provided that Defendant would pay Plaintiff 25% of the value of services
rendered to Defendant, in cash, ten days following the end of the month in
which the services were rendered and the remaining 75% of the value of the
services would be applied towards the $ 14,500.00 credit.
By the Appellee's judicial admissions, it is undisputed that the parties believed there to be
a contract. For the foregoing, a new trial should be granted to further explore the alleged
breaches of the agreement or Defendant should be awarded a judgment less an offset amount.
c.

The Testimony and Conduct of the Appellee Show the Existence of a Contract
In addition to the judicial admissions by the Appellee that a contract existed, during

trial the Appellee provided undisputed evidence of a contract between the parties. A contract is
formed when one party makes an offer to another, the other party accepts the offer, and each
party gives something of value in return for what the party received. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2204; IJI § 10.2; see also, Osguthorpe v. Anschutz Land & Livestock Co., 456 F.2d 996 (10th Cir.
1972). Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-204 states that "a contract for the sale of goods may be made in
any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties which recognizes the
existence of such a contract." Id.
In the present case, the existence of a contract between the parties is apparent by looking
at the testimony and conduct of the parties. The Appellant had given a truck to the Appellee, and
4

in return, the Appellee had provided Appellant with disposal services. (R at 33-36). During trial,
Appellee testified that the parties had bargained for, and reached an agreement. (R. at 19, 20).
In testifying about Exhibit 2, Mr. Anderson testified on cross examination that A-l
acknowledged a credit owing to Ingersoll in the amount of $14,500.00 "on the strength of
IngersoU's promise to deliver a truck to Mark Powell." (R. at 31, 34). The legal theory presented
in the Appellee's case was that the contract had failed because Mr. Ingersoll had failed to deliver
the truck to Powell.(R. at 8, 9).
Never did the Appellee argue that there was not a contract between the parties. After Mr.
Ingersoll presented his case, and the indisputable evidence that the truck had been delivered to
Powell by him, Appellee changed its tune to argue that Mr. Ingersoll had breached the contract
by not paying the 25% cash amount called for under the contract, but even then, Appellee did not
argue that there was no contract. (R. at 142).
VI. CONCLUSION
Because the facts will not support the trial court's conclusion that there was no contract
formed by which A-l acknowledged a $14,500 credit to Ingersoll, the trial court's decision
should be reversed to find in favor of Ingersoll in the amount of the unused credit, which is
$6,193.00.
DATED this j £ of August, 2006.

Blake S. Atkin
Brennan H. Moss
Attorneys for Appellant
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
A - l DISPOSAL,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Plaintiff,
Case No. 030904374
vs.

Honorable BRUCE C. LUBEQKco j>
MEL INGERSOLL,
9:-<

Defendant,

o
o ro
C3

DATE: April 28, 2005
MEL INGERSOLL,
C

Counterclaim
Plaintiff,

V<^

ft

vs.
RALPH ANDERSON and A-l
DISPOSAL,
Counterclaim
Defendants,

The above matter came before the court for a bench trial on
April 27, 2005. Plaintiff was present through Carl Kingston and
Defendant was present with Blake Atkin,
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed a complaint February 25, 2003.

It alleged

defendant owed, for services, the sum of $9006 plus interest.
Defendant on March 26, 2003, filed an answer and
counterclaim alleging in the counterclaim that Anderson does
business as A-l and that Anderson and Ingersoll entered a
contract in May, 2002, and that contract acknowledged Anderson

en

O 39

5|g

owed a credit to Ingersoll in the sum of $14,500.

The

counterclaim alleged the performance by Anderson was poor.
Ingersoll further alleged the parties in October, 2002, resolved
the matter and Anderson owes Ingersoll as a credit the sum of
$6139.
The parties engaged in discovery and this trial date was
scheduled.

The court heard evidence, received exhibits, heard argument
of counsel, and is fully advised.

The court finds as follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. A-1 Disposal is a registered dba of Four Corners
Precision Mfg. Co, a corporation, and Anderson is an authorized
agent of A-1 and the manager of that business. It engages in the
business of trash pick up and disposal.
2. Mark Powell (Powell) was a customer of A-1 and owed A-1
money for its services. The evidence did not reveal the amount of
that debt. Powell introduced A-1, through Anderson, to Ingersoll,
who ran a demolition business and used and needed such trash
pickup and disposal services.
3. In a meeting held May 15, 2002, Ingersoll met with Powell
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and Anderson at a fast food restaurant over lunch. That was the
first meeting or business A-1 and Ingersoll had.

A-1 and

Ingersoll, as well as Powell, came to an agreement that was
partially put in writing by Ingersoll. It was written on scratch
paper. It was signed by Anderson, on behalf of A-1, and
Ingersoll.

It stated (Exhibit 2) :

Wherein A-1 acknowledges a credit owing Mel Ingersoll in the
amount of $14,500, to be paid in the following manner: A-1
will furnish 30 yard (drop off) containers for Ingersoll for
a cost of $75.00 each with A-1 paying landfill cost over
that. Thereby if trucking & landfill total $10,000 for a
month, Ingersoll will pay $2500 and use the $7500 credit on
the amount due. Billing will be at month end, with the
payment 25% of total bill to be paid by 10th of month
following. Service can continue after credit is used- up if
its agreeable with both parties.
4. There were also oral agreements between these persons in
the same meeting and the written document was not the sole
agreement.

Powell owned a truck and three containers that he

agreed to give to A-1.

Ingersoll owned a different truck that he

agreed to give to Powell, along with title to that second truck.
Powell did turn over the truck to A-1 and later two of the three
containers. That truck, which was undefined by the testimony as
to year and make and value, has not been functional and A-1 has
been unable to use it.
received by A-1.

The third container has never been

Ingersoll, no later than June, 2002, turned

over the second truck and title to Powell as Ingersoll promised.
That is shown by the title to that truck, Exhibit 5. The reason
A-1 acknowledged the credit to Ingersoll, who A-1 had never met
3

nor done business with, was because Powell was giving the truck
and three containers to A-l and Ingersoll was giving a truck to
Powell.
5. A-l began its service almost immediately.

The parties

disagree on the sufficiency of that service and adduced more
evidence on the subject than was needed.

The court finds that

the service provided was pursuant to any agreement the parties
had, but that the exact nature of the service was not resolved in
any agreement.
6. The service was provided from mid-May through August,
2002.

Weekly invoices were sent by A-l to Ingersoll.

Ingersoll

made no payments of any kind toward the service provided.
7. A-l and Ingersoll talked in July and August about the
bill and Ingersoll acknowledged he owed some money but needed to
reconcile the invoices and come to an agreed upon figure that
was owing. At the end of August A-l ceased the trash pick up and
disposal.

There was no testimony about exactly why that service

ceased but the court finds the parties implicitly agreed that the
service would stop.
8. Eventually Anderson and Ingersoll met on October 18,
2002, in an informal setting at a job site of Ingersoll.

There

the parties wrote out figures on paper and agreed that Ingersoll
owed for 37 trips, plus a surcharge, for a total owing for
services in the amount of $8307.

4

The paper has figures but

no words of agreement except as set out below. Ingersoll wrote on
that paper the sum of $14,500, subtracting the amount
acknowledged of $8307, leaving a balance figure of $6193.

To

that figure Anderson wrote "25% $2076" plus $6193 for a total of
$8269.

Anderson wrote beside the figure $8307 "account balance

as of 10-18-02" and signed that portion. The parties disagree on
what that writing and those figures mean and what was discussed
concerning those figures. Exhibit 3.
9. Sometime in November, 2002, Anderson, Powell, Ingersoll
and Daniel Kingston, an officer of A-l, met in Kingston's office.
The parties discussed what was owed by whom and their versions
differ greatly.
10. The court finds that in the October 18 meeting Ingersoll
acknowledged the amount he owed for service by A-l was $8307.
There was no agreement of the parties, no meeting of the minds,
on any other facet of that writing nor on anything else discussed
at that meeting.

They did not form a contract about any other

fact except that Ingersoll acknowledged the value of services was
the sum of $8307.
11. In the November, 2002, meeting, Ingersoll indicated he
was dealing with A-l for himself and Powell, who was also
present. Ingersoll said he wanted to resolve both accounts with
A-l, his and Powell''s. Ingersoll acknowledged that he owed the
sum of $8307 and that the remaining "credit" of $6193 could be
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applied to what Powell owed A-l, as Ingersoll would rather have
Powell owe Ingersoll rather than A-l owe Ingersoll money.
12. In December, 2002, A-l applied that credit of $6139 to
Powell's account, leaving a balance due by Ingersoll $8307.

Based on the above findings and discussion, the court makes
the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The May 15, 2002, written document is not an integrated
contract and indeed was not even a valid contract as it did not
fully state several essential terms to form a valid agreement. It
is ambiguous in the extreme4 and the court can thus look outside
the agreement to attempt to find the intent of the parties.
Examining all the evidence the court cannot decipher what the
intent of the parties was.
2. The integral features were not agreed upon.

A-l did not

give a "credit" of $14,500 to a person A-l had never met or done
business with, as Ingersoll contends, based on the consideration
of Powell's "promise" to provide a truck.

There was simply no

meeting of the minds, and the intentions of the parties never
really existed under this alleged agreement.

Thus, there is no

contract to enforce at all, by either party.

The court cannot

determine whether the u key" features have been breached or not,
and so there is no contract to enforce.
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The circumstances under

which the "agreement" was entered into require the court to
conclude that there was no intelligible agreement that can be
enforced by either party.
3. The course of conduct of the parties can modify an
agreement, had there been one, and that course of conduct was
that A-1 would continue to provide a service and Ingersoll would
pay for it in some fashion.

This is not a multiple party

contract where the consideration is, as Ingersoll posits,
Powell's promise to pay by providing a truck of some unnamed
value and Ingersoll would provide a truck of some unnamed value
to Powell.
4. The October 18, 2002, meeting further solidifies in the
mind of the court that the parties never achieved a meeting of
the minds, never agreed on the essential terms of anything.

The

parties did agree only on the value of the services to date,
$8307. A-1 and Ingersoll did not agree whether that sum would be
paid, whether A-1 would pay Ingersoll the remaining amount of
credit, whether Powell would be credited with that amount, or
whether Powell would be credited with some other amount.
5. The November 2002 meeting likewise did not result in any
agreement or meeting of the minds.

The court concludes that

neither party agreed with the other about essential terms such
that a valid agreement was formed.

A-1 intended Ingersoll to pay

the value of the services and credit Powell's account.
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Ingersoll

intended that A-1 pay Ingersoll the amount of "'credit" because
Powell had provided the truck to A-1 and Ingersoll had provided a
truck to Powell.
6. The court is not ruling that Powell breached by not
providing a working truck.

The court is not ruling whether

Ingersoll breached in providing the other truck he provided
timely to Ingersoll.
case.

Those issues are not governing in this

What governs is the lack of an agreement.
7. The essential terms of an agreement were never reached.

The missing terms were how and when Ingersoll would pay and what
was the consideration for the credit to Ingersoll.

Ingersoll's

argument is not persuasive that the consideration was Powell's
promise to provide a truck to A-1. Those essential terms of
payment, payment for what, what credit was to be given and to
whom, and the consideration for that credit are not set out in an
intelligible contract nor were they agreed to verbally.

Thus,

there is no contract to enforce.
8. On a theory of unjust enrichment, Ingersoll benefitted by
receiving the services of A-1.

Ingersoll acknowledged and agreed

that the value of services he received was $8307.

The court

concludes it would be inequitable to allow Ingersoll to retain
the benefit of that service without paying for it.

Plaintiff is

entitled to judgment in that amount, plus statutory interest from
the date of September 10, 2002, the last date of billing.
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Ingersoll is not entitled to judgment on his counterclaim. Any
other issues between these parties and Powell will have to be
resolved independent of these claims. The motion to dismiss made
by Ingersoll, taken under advisement at the end of plaintiff's
case, is denied.
9. No attorney fees are awarded.

Plaintiff is to prepare an order and judgment in compliance
with URCP, Rule 7(f) setting forth this ruling.

L,

^~?

DATED this

day °t/<n(lC

j

2005,

BY ^THE'

BftUCE C. LUBECK
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 030904374 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Dated this

Jj$

day of

fUIAA

I

NAME
CARL E KINGSTON
ATTORNEY PLA
3212 S STATE ST
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84115
MICHAEL J LANGFORD
ATTORNEY DEF
13 6 S MAIN ST 6TH FLR
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101
20 <*">

*^

Deputy Court Clerk

Paap 1

(lsqt-1

CARL E. KINGSTON (#1826)
Attorney for Plaintiff
3212 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Phone: 486-1458

THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE COUNTY,
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
—oooOooo—
A-l DISPOSAL,

:

Plaintiff,

:

vs.

COMPLAINT

:

Civil No.
MEL INGERSOLL,
Defendant,

:
Judge
—oooOooo—

Comes now the Plaintiff and for cause of action alleges:
1. Defendant is a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
2. The amount sought herein is less than $20,000.00, exclusive of costs.
3. Defendant owes Plaintiff the sum of $9,006.25 plus interest thereon from
December 1, 2002 at the rate of 18% per annum, for merchandise and/or services
provided at Defendant's request.
4. The total amount set forth above is past due and remains unpaid, despite
demand.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against in the sum of $9,006.25 plus
interest thereon at the rate of 18% per annum from December 1, 2002, attorney's fees of
$775.00 or such greater sum as the Court deems reasonable, for its costs and for such
other and further relief as to the Court seems

just.
Dated this

}?

day of February, 2003.

Carl E. Kingston
Attorney for Plaintiff
Plaintiffs address:
624 North 300 West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103

CARL E. KINGSTON (#1826)
Attorney for Plaintiff
3212 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Phone: 486-1458

THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE COUNTY,
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
—oooOooo—

A-l DISPOSAL,

:

Plaintiff,

:

(Proposed)
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
Civil No. 030904374
MELINGERSOLL,
Defendant.

:
Judge Collection
—oooOooo—

The above entitled action came on regularly for trial before the Honorable Bruce
C. Lubeck, on April 27, 2005, at 9:00 a.m. The Plaintiff appeared through its agents and
was represented by Carl E. Kingston, and Defendant appeared and was represented by
Michael Langford.

The Court heard testimony of the parties and witnesses called,

reviewed the evidence submitted, heard oral arguments of counsel, and being folly
advised in the premises, now makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. That the court has jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter of this
lawsuit.
2. That the Plaintiff, A-l Disposal, is a registered d/b/a of Four Comers
Precision Manufacturing, Co., a Utah corporation.
3. That Ralph Anderson is the Secretary of Four Corners Precision
Manufacturing Co., and the manager of A-l Disposal.

4. That Ralph Anderson was acting as agent for A-l Disposal at all material
times in this case.
5. That the parties entered into an agreement on or about May 15, 2002, whereby
Plaintiff would provide disposal serviced to Defendant at certain prices agreed upon.
6. That part of the agreement was that Defendant would provide a certain motor
vehicle valued at $14,500.00 to one Mark Powell, Mark Powell would deliver a motor
vehicle and three roll-off containers valued at $14,500.00 to Plaintiff and Defendant
would be entitled to credit for the value of the vehicle he provided to Powell in the
amount of $14,500.00, from Plaintiff.

The agreement also provided that Defendant

would pay Plaintiff 25% of the value of services rendered to Defendant by Plaintiff, in
cash, ten days following the end of the month in which the services were rendered and
the remaining 75% of the value of the services would be applied towards the $14,500.00
credit.
7. That during the months of May, June, July and August, 2002, Defendant
ordered services from Plaintiff with an agreed value of $8,307.00 and Plaintiff provided
those services to Defendant.
8. That the May 15, 2002 agreement became void when Powell failed to provide
three roll-off containers to Plaintiff, Defendant failed to provide Mark Powell with the
motor vehicle Defendant agreed to deliver, Defendant failed to pay Plaintiff the 25% of
the value of the services provided when due and Defendant discontinued the use of
Plaintiff's services.
9. Plaintiff continued to provide service to Mark Powell and gave him credit for
the value of the truck and two roll-off containers he provided to Plaintiff, towards the
services provided by Plaintiff to Powell.
10. The reasonable value of the services provided to Defendant by plaintiff was
$8,307.00.
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WHEREFORE, having made the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court draws
therefrom, these, its
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The May 15, 2002 agreement is void for non-performance of the parties.
2. Plaintiff provided garbage disposal services to Defendant at the agreed upon
value of $8,307.00.
3. Defendant owes Plaintiff the sum of $8,307.00 for the services provided.
4. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against Defendant in the amount of $8,307.00,
interest thereon at the rate of 10% per annum from September 10, 2002 and its court
costs.
5. Defendant's Counterclaim against Ralph Anderson should be dismissed, for no
cause of action.
Dated this

day of April, 2005.
BY THE COURT:

District Judge

CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing (Proposed) Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law to Michael J. Langford, Esq., 136 South Main Street, 6thFloor,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, this

^ ~

day of April, 2005, postage prepaid.

^

Carl E. Kingston

3

1 the 10th of that month.

In other words, the services that

2 were performed in May would be billed out at the end of May,
3

the first of June, and 2 5 percent of the value of those

4

services would be paid by the 10th of June.

5

75 percent would be credited towards the value of the truck.

6

The remaining

Very shortly after the agreement was signed —

7 well, I think even the same day — A-1 started providing
8

services to Mr. Ingersoll.

9 wasn't followed through.

A-1 was not able to get all of the

10 containers for Mr. Powell.
11
12
13

couple of containers.

But the rest of the agreement

And they got the truck and a

Mr. Powell was not able to get the

truck for Mr. Ingersoll, or at least the title to the truck
so that he could use it.

And after billing Mr. Ingersoll,

14 the 2 5 percent was not paid.

So that agreement, at least in

15 the eyes of the plaintiff, was void.
16
17

It wasn't followed

through; it was breached.
A-1 continued to provided services through June,

18

through July, through August, and send bills and statements

19

to Mr. Ingersoll.

20

between A-1 and Mr. Powell and Mr. Ingersoll, sometimes

21

together sometimes separately, where it was acknowledged

22

there was an amount owed.

23

agreement that the value of the services was some $8,307.

24

And it was always a commitment that that would be taken care

25

of, but never was.

Nothing was paid.

There were meetings

In fact, they reached an

8

1

In July, when Mr. Powell was unable to get what he

2 wanted from Mr. Ingersoll, he told A-l, "Give me the credit
3 because I gave you the truck."

So the credit for the truck

4 was given to Mr. Powell.
5

A-l, despite trying to collect from Mr. Ingersoll,

6 never did, and so we filed this lawsuit, and that's why
7 we're here today.
8 show.

And I think that's what the evidence will

When the trial is completed, we'll be asking for

9 judgment for the value of the services that were rendered,
10 plus interest for that amount.
11

Thank you.

12

THE COURT:

13

Mr. Atkin?

14

MR. ATKIN:

15 simple in this case.

Thank you, Mr. Kingston.

Your Honor, I agree that the facts are
You have a classic three-way contract

16 here, multi-lateral contract that's described in Restatement
17 II of Contracts, Section 71, where the consideration is
18 passing between different parties.

Comment E of the

19 Restatement, Section 71, example No. 17, you have:

A

20 promises B to pay B a dollar in exchange for C's promise to
21 A to give A a book.
22 one another.

The promises are a consideration for

In this case, you replace A with A-l Disposal,

23 A-l Disposal promised to pay Mr. Ingersoll, in this case it
24 was $14,500, in exchange for Mr. Powell's promise to give A25 1 Disposal a truck.

1

Q.

Can you relate, to the best of your recollection,

2 the conversation that occurred between you and Mr. Powell
3 and Mr. Ingersoll at that meeting?
4

A.

Mark introduced us to one another and Mel told me

5 that he was in the similar businesses, Mark Powell did a lot
6 of demolition.

And we talked about the services.

Mark told

7 them how well we had done on —
MR. ATKIN:

8

9 is my objection.

Objection, Your Honor.

The — hearsay

Mr. Powell — M r . Powellfs statements would

10 be hearsay.
11

MR. KINGSTON:

12

THE COURT:

I don f t think so.

I don't — I f m not receiving t h e m — I

13 don't think they're offered for and I'm not receiving them
14 for the truth.

I think they're part of the operative legal

15 pact of forming a contract.

So, yeah, avoid any — as much

16 as you can what Mr. Powell said about this unrelated to
17 the — to the contract.
THE WITNESS:

18

But, overruled.

I'll hear that.

And we talked about the job that we

19 had done for Mark Powell.

And then we negotiated what the

20 price would be for us to do service for Mel Ingersoll.
21

Q.

(By Mr. Kingston)

And what precisely was the

22 agreement that was reached between the three parties at that
23 meeting?
24

A.

Mark would deliver a truck — a roll-off truck and

25 three containers to us and Mel would deliver a truck to Mark

19

1
2

Powell and we would provide service.
Q.

Was the value of the truck that Mr. Powell was to

3

receive from Ingersoll about the same value as the truck and

4

roll-off containers that you were to receive from

5

Mr. Powell?

6

A.

They said it was.

7

Q.

And what was that value; do you remember?

8

A.

$14,500.

9

Q.

Let me show you what has been marked as

10
11
12
13

Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2.
A.

Yeah.

Can you identify that document?

This is the agreement that Mel Ingersoll

wrote up.
Q.

Now, the agreement says:

"A-l will provide — or

14

furnish 3 0-yard roll-off containers for Ingersoll for a cost

15

of $75 each, with A-l paying land fill costs over that

16

amount of trucking and land fill total ten thousand for a

17

month.

18

as the amount due."
Can you explain exactly what you understood that

19
20
21

Ingersoll will pay $2,500 and use up $7,500 credit

to be?
A.

Yeah.

We would bill him $75 for each load.

$75

22

plus the landfill fees.

23

he would reimburse us for that because he didn't have an

24

account at the landfill.

25

Q.

We was to pay the landfill and then

And what about payment to A-l for that service?

20

1
2

to be a Philadelphia lawyer to try to understand those
invoices"?

Do you recall that?

3

A.

He had a lot of funny lines like that.

4

Q.

Okay.

Now, going back to this Exhibit 1, in — not

5

Exhibit 1, it's Exhibit 2.

6

copies of these —

And, Your Honor, do you have a

7

THE COURT:

I don't.

8

MR. ATKIN:

Could I approach the Court with a copy

10

THE COURT:

Certainly.

11

MR. ATKIN:

It may make it easier to follow along.

9

12
13
14

of those?

Q.

Going back to what has been marked as Plaintiff's

Exhibit 2, or has been introduced now into evidence, this
Exhibit 2, the first line of this agreement says:

"A-1

15 acknowledges a credit owing Mel Ingersoll in the amount of
16

$14,500."

Do you see that?

17

A.

Yes.

18

Q.

Okay.

And that promise by A-1 to give

19 Mr. Ingersoll $14,500, that was on the strength of a promise
20 by Mark Powell to deliver a truck to A-1 Disposal, correct?
21
22
23
0d

A.

A truck and three containers.

A truck in working

condition and three containers.
Q.

Okay.

Now, let me ask you about that.

In your

deposition that we took, I asked you about that

25 consideration that you were receiving; do you recall that?
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1

A.

Yes.

2

Q.

And you didn't mention anything about three

3 containers in giving that answer to me, did you?
4

A.

I may not have.

5

Q.

Okay.

And then I asked you again:

"Do you still

6 have the truck?"
And you answered, "Yes."

7

Do you recall that?

8

A.

Uh-huh.

(Affirmative.)

9

Q.

And, again, you didn't mention anything about any

10 three containers that you claimed you didn't receive, did
11 you?
12

A.

I don't recall.

13

Q.

Okay.

And then I asked you later:

"Did you still

14 have possession of the truck?"
And you answered "Yes."

15

But, again, didn't say

16 anything about any three containers that you claim now that
17 you didn't receive, right?
18

A.

Okay.

19

Q.

And then, later on, I asked you again,

20

"Question:

So Mel was going to deliver the truck to

21 Mark, Mark was going to deliver the truck, the white
22 Expeditor, to you in exchange for the $14,500 credit?"
Your answer was "Yes."

23
24

"Question:

You in fact received the white Expeditor

25 truck?"

33

Answer was "Yes."

1
2

"Question:

And you still possess it today?"

3

And the answer was "Yes."

4

Do you recall giving those answers?

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

And, again, no mention in any of that dialogue

7 about not having received any three containers, is there?
8

A.

Not that you read just barely, there wasn't.

9

Q.

Okay.

And there was no mention about truck having

10 to be in working condition either, was there?
11

A.

Maybe not with you, but it was with Mark and Mel.

12

Q.

Okay.

13

Well, when I asked you the question what

this contract was based on and I asked you, "Did you receive

14 that truck," you told me yes, and you mention any missing
15 containers, correct?
16
17
18

A.

Not from what you read.

conversation.
Q.

Okay.

I'm sure if there was something that your

19

counsel would bring it up.

20

me move on.

21

I don't remember the

Okay.

22 I15th, 2002.

But anyway — strike that and let

So we have this contract, Exhibit 2, May

You acknowledge a $14,500 credit to Mel

23

Ingersoll, and that's on the strength of this promise by Mel

24

Ingersoll to give a truck to Mark Powell and then Mark

25

Powell's going to give the truck to A-1 Disposal, correct?

34

1
2

A.

A truck and three containers.

Q.

Well, and we — we read your testimony that you

3 received that truck and that truck was still in your
4 possession at the time of the deposition that I took in
5 November, correct?
6

A.

Right.

7

Q.

All right.

Now, you testified that in July of

8 2 0 02 — this is several months after Exhibit 2 has been
9 entered into — you testified that Mark Powell asked you to
10 apply the $14,500 credit to his account rather than applying
11 it to Mel Ingersoll's account.

Do you recall that

12 testimony?
13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

Okay.

And at that time, in July of 2 002, you

15 refused to do that for Mr. Powell, didn't you?
16

A.

I told him that we should get together and work

17 out the deal.
18

Q.

Okay.

You understood that that was not something

19 that you could unilaterally do at Mr. Powell's request
20 because Mel Ingersoll was part of that agreement, correct?
21

A.

Right.

22

Q.

And you had already acknowledged to Mel Ingersoll

23 that he was entitled to a $14,500 credit, right?
24

A.

As long as we had our truck and three containers

25 and Mark Powell got his truck.

35

Q.

1

Well, that's not in Exhibit 2, is it?

Is there

2 any mention in Exhibit 2 of — of the fact that Mr. Ingersoll
3 was going to deliver a truck to Mr. Powell?
4

A.

No.

That was verbal.

5

Q.

Okay.

Mr. Powell was there at the meeting when

6 Exhibit 2 was prepared, wasn't he?
7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

And, yet, who signed Exhibit 2?

9

A.

Myself and Mel.

10

Q.

And Mr. Powell didn't even sign Exhibit 2, did he?

11

A.

No.

12

Q.

Okay.

So it's true, isn't it, Mr. Anderson, that

13 the $14,500 credit that you promised to give Mr. Ingersoll
14 was on the basis of the promise of Mark Powell to deliver a
15 truck to you?
16

A.

And the basis of Mel to deliver a truck to Powell.

17

Q.

Well, but that's not included in the agreement, is

19

A.

No.

20

Q.

All right.

18 it?

21

That was verbal.
Now, after July of 2002, after you

claim that Mr. Powell asked you to apply that credit to his

22 account rather than Mel's and you said you couldn't do that
23 without talking to Mel, after that point in time, you
24 continued to provide services to Mel Ingersoll, didn't you?
25

A.

Yes, we did.

36

Even if, as Mr. Atkin would represent, the breach
of Mr. Ingersoll, if there was one, towards Mr. Powell
wouldn't be considered a breach of the agreement between the
other two parties.

It's very clear that Mr. Ingersoll

himself breached the agreement by not complying with the
terms of paying the 25 percent.

He complains about the

I service and yet he used the service through May, he used the
service through June, he used the service through July, he
used the service through August.
|

And the testimony of Mr. Ingersoll's son is that

there was one occasion in that period of time when he was
I disappointed with the service when a driver came up, the
dumpster wasn't ready to be taken yet, and he took off with
it without taking the dumpster.

That's in four months' time

period.
And also the agreement is very specific that in
order for him to get that credit, he has to continue the
service of A-l.

There wasn't any agreement that he paid

cash; that was to be paid in service.
a breach of that agreement.

So there was clearly

There was a breach of the

agreement that Mr. Powell didn't deliver what he was
supposed to.

And there was testimony, at least from what A-

1 understood, that Mr. Ingersoll hadn't delivered what he
agreed to do.
Now, I acknowledge that, with this exhibit of the
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